

Swedish Defence College
Stockholm

**UN Integrated Missions and the relationship with
Humanitarian Organisations**

Julian Harston

Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations (rtd)

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

I worked with the United Kingdom Diplomatic Service for some 25 years before joining the United Nations as Head of the political department of the ill fated UNPROFOR in 1995. My second career in the UN took me to Zagreb to Belgrade (three times), to Sarajevo, to Haiti, to East Timor to the Western Sahara and to New York. I was Head of the UN Missions in Haiti, and Western Sahara and Deputy in Sarajevo. In New York I was Director of Peacekeeping for Asia and the Middle East. I have worked in 7 UN Peacekeeping Missions and directed the activities of 5 more. Above all I am a practitioner not an academic. I have the added advantage of being retired. Thus the judgements I will offer you are my own, not those of the UN or any of my previous masters.....

Eli Wiesel, Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Buchenwald survivor, and according to the Nobel Committee, ‘ a messenger to mankind ‘, said recently ‘ The winds of madness are blowing ‘

His Holiness Pope Francis said a month or so ago, ‘World War three has started’, and you know what they say about infallibility.....

I have spent a working life in the fields of Diplomacy and Security and I do not remember a moment when so much of the world was in such danger. I do not remember a time when so much was being asked of the decision makers in the world, and so little vision and statesmanship is being shown. (with the possible exception of Germany)

Most of the last year in Europe at least has been taken up with noise, economic and political action against Russia, and some small changes in the posture of NATO.....because of Ukraine.

Noise has replaced diplomacy....we now have megaphone diplomacy as Paddy Ashdowne has called it.

My experience of diplomacy has been that it is most successful when hidden. Like mushrooms, diplomacy thrives in the dark.

This is clearly not the view of our present leaders. They seem to have forgotten that mutual understanding means understanding how the other side sees you....perception is vitally important in the diplomatic game. Public statements are rarely helpful and frequently very damaging. As Dr.William Polck, White house Adviser and University of Chicago Professor, wrote recently, ‘ I have been increasingly impressed -- and worried -- by what seem to me to be misunderstandings of basic elements in international relations. Among these are perception of issues, notions of strategy and assignment of role; put another way -- what do we think and what do they think, what can either side actually do, and who makes the decisions?

We all have a stake in achieving a clear understanding of them because, as we see today, governments have a tendency to leap before they look or even not to look at all.

Let me take you briefly back to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. In a nutshell the US had missiles in Turkey just across the border of the Soviet Union. The American government thought they were defensive. They were part of the US "deterrent." They were there to protect the US, not to threaten the Russians.

The Russians thought otherwise. So, in response, they decided to station some of their missiles in Cuba. Their strategists believed that in balancing US missiles on their frontier, theirs on the US doorstep also were defensive.

The US thought otherwise. The US regarded the Soviet move as unquestionably offensive and nearly went to war to get them to remove their missiles.

At a "few minutes to midnight," both nuclear powers came to their senses: The US stood down their Jupiters and the Russians removed their weapons from Cuba.

The first lesson to be learned in this near catastrophe was *try to understand the opponent's point of view*. Knowing what the other person thinks is always sensible -- as we know and act in daily life --the Swedes are particularly good at this, even if one does not believe that the other person is right or even if one does not intend to be guided by what one discovers. Unfortunately, as history teaches us, this is a lesson rarely applied in foreign affairs never less so than in 2014.....

In the many, and multiplying, conflict areas in the world there is a need not just for simple military solutions or regime change but also for an understanding that a stable society and sustainable peace can only be built by creating enough security on which to build an inclusive political solution.

It is essentially this formula that is the basis of my talk to you today.

Let me quote President Obama in a recent Press conference

I'll give you an example of a lesson I had to learn that still has ramifications to this day," said Obama. "And that is our participation in the coalition that overthrew Qaddafi in Libya. I absolutely believed that it was the right thing to do. ... Had we not intervened, it's likely that Libya would be Syria. ... And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction. But what is also true is that I think we [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you're going to do this. Then it's the day after Qaddafi is gone, when everybody is feeling good and everybody is holding up posters saying, 'Thank you, America.' At that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn't have any civic traditions. ... So that's a lesson that I now apply every time I ask the question, 'Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer [for] the day after?'

What do you think about the UN, and its capabilities in dealing with issues of international peace and security through the mechanisms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding?

Perhaps not very much.....

Too much politics and too little decisive action. Waste of resources. Bad command and control structures. Poor security. Difficult relations with Regional Organisations (AU)

Soldiers who are only there for the money.

During my time in peacekeeping all these things have been true at one time or another, in greater or lesser measure.

And yet, the UN can deliver large numbers of troops on the ground quickly, it has proven its ability to operate and sustain missions in some of the most hostile environments in the world. The UN has had extraordinary successes and some bloody failures. UN Peacekeeping is statistically more likely to succeed than any other variety, and it is proven to be cheaper.

And through the learning processes involved in our Missions in Cambodia, the Balkans, Haiti, Central America, Namibia, Mozambique, and elsewhere the UN developed the concept that is now known as ‘ the comprehensive, or, integrated approach’.

An understanding that peace can neither be kept, nor built on the basis of a military plan that is divorced from a political strategy.

Senator Rumsfeld’s affirmation that the US Department of Defence’s plan for post invasion Iraq was ‘to have no plan’, was the start point of

a steep learning curve in the US, NATO, the EU, and elsewhere that has led us to where we are today.

The integrated approach, I believe, is the coordination of all available "instruments of power, in order to enable each of these instruments to accomplish actions leading to a change of initially unacceptable conditions into a set of acceptable ones; the comprehensive end-state.

I understand the instinctive professional military reaction to Peacebuilding and the comprehensive approach. Life would be so much simpler if we could all just be left to do what we believe we are good at. But life isn't simple and the most important lesson learned by the UN in the last twenty years of peacekeeping is that with the right resources, the right mandate and the right leadership the comprehensive, civilian led, approach works and must be the basis of the international community's efforts to deal with the growing number of conflicts which have their roots and sustenance in failed and failing states.

In the next few years you will hear more of Mali, the Central African Republic, the ungoverned spaces in north west Africa, Yemen and Somalia and even as you have seen in the last few weeks, perhaps a part of the Balkans as being real threats to us here in Europe which we need to deal with in a comprehensive way. What this kind of peacekeeping needs is professional military officers who understand that it is essentially a political process in which they are

involved and professional civilians to manage the broader process . The more prepared the soldier, the easier it will be for the political side of the Mission to succeed to the point that it no longer needs the military and they can move on with the job done.

If I may digress here for a few moments. Eighteen months ago, I was asked to undertake a Strategic Review of UNIFIL, the UN Peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. I presented my report to the Security Council . UNIFIL was remodeled by the international community in the days which followed the war between Israel and Lebanon 6 years ago.

The new UNIFIL, with an authorized strength of 15000 troops, together with a maritime component of six naval vessels was operational within a few weeks. The Mission included significant contributions from NATO nations (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal, among them) some wearing blue helmets for the first time since UNPROFOR in the Balkans in the late 1990s.

The Mission has proven to be an outstanding military success. Southern Lebanon has had the quietest 6 years in its history.

But SCR 1701 which brought the new UNIFIL into being had a second and equally important objective. This was to bring about a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. This has not happened.

What my review said is that unless there is political progress all that has been gained by the military risks being lost. It is closer to being lost today than at any time in the last six years. I wont go into detail

about my recommendations , but they were almost all designed to try to bring the political track up to speed. They are designed to encourage the two parties to invest enough in political stability to persuade them that going back to war would be fundamentally against their national interests.

There is no better or more timely example that I can give you that Peace Support is about politics, and if the politics are left behind, then the process will fail.

In what direction the question of military support to peacekeeping and peace building is going.

Well, after a decade of considerable surge, it appeared until very recently that UN peacekeeping was headed toward a period of consolidation and perhaps even contraction., however with the recent Mission in Syria and Libya, and South Sudan this no longer seems to be the case.

The challenges peacekeepers are facing today in many ways remain daunting. Today, we are asking peacekeepers to do more, in more places, and in more complex conflicts than at any time in history. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to environments that are inhospitable, remote and dangerous, sometimes with inadequate logistical support and resources. The diversity of missions is likely to continue to grow, as are the expectations in terms of what UN peacekeeping should deliver. Missions' mandates are increasingly more complex and multidimensional. While we still have traditional missions

supporting a ceasefire agreement between two or more parties, we also manage multi-dimensional missions, supporting a peace process and national authorities after civil conflict, on the other end of the spectrum. These missions cover vast territories, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, and have complex mandates ranging from supporting elections and state capacity, to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and improving the management of the security sector. Other missions provide security and protection in response to a conflict. Increasingly, UN peacekeepers are called upon to take a more *robust* approach to implement complex mission mandates, and to deter spoilers to a peace process, to the mandate, and to mission personnel.

The U.N. Security Council on March 29 last year unanimously approved an "offensive" peacekeeping brigade to fight rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the first U.N. force of its kind. The force of more than 2,500 troops was authorized to "neutralize" and "disarm" the rebel groups. In early January 2015 the Netherlands deployed attack helicopters to Mali, in support of the United Nations and they have already been in action. These further excursions into 'robust peacekeeping is troubling to me, not just because it brings further into question the status of the Peacekeeping force, and more importantly perhaps the humanitarians operating alongside them, but because I have not yet seen a convincing political strategy and end state for the DRC.

Today, two-thirds of UN peacekeepers are operating in active conflict areas, the highest percentage ever. Peacekeepers often deploy to areas where myriad rebel groups and militias have made clear that they intend to keep fighting. And the warring parties in modern conflicts increasingly include violent extremist groups, who terrorize civilians and view peacekeepers - openly treat peacekeepers as legitimate targets.

The strain on the system would be challenging enough if we were asking peacekeepers simply to do what they used to do - to monitor ceasefires between two consenting states. But we're giving peacekeepers broad and increasingly demanding responsibilities in increasingly inhospitable domains. We are asking them to contain - and at times, even disarm - violent groups, like the countless rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. We're asking them to ensure safe delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance, as peacekeepers have done in South Sudan. We are asking them to protect civilians from atrocities, such as those being carried out in the Central African Republic. And we are asking them to help provide stability in countries emerging from brutal civil wars, as in Liberia. And in virtually all of these missions, we are asking them to carry out these duties in countries where governments are extremely weak, and often unable to meet the basic needs of their citizens.

Missions are now routinely given the mandate to “protect civilians” This carries significant policy and operational challenges, and will I believe mean that there will be no Chapter 6 Missions in the future.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the emergence of a new type of operation, which also seeks to address the underlying causes of conflict. These operations have found themselves involved in activities to promote democratic practices; to build sustainable institutions; and to enhance respect for human rights. They essentially attempt to enable a society to complete within six to seven years an evolutionary process that would ordinarily take decades or centuries.

There are currently seventeen UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, made up of nearly 130,000 personnel, at least 100,000 of them are uniformed military and police, compared to just 20,000 total personnel a decade ago. That's not to mention the more than 20,000 peacekeepers fighting in the African Union's mission in Somalia. The budget more than 8 billion US Dollars

The annual procurement bill for peacekeeping now approaches \$3 billion annually. Each of these figures still represents an historic high.

Our discussions today are brought into sharper focus by recent events around the world .

Peacekeeping and peace building national security and human security issues form one continuum. There is no dividing line any more between the hard issues and the so called soft issues. Neither are conflicts limited any longer by national borders, and they can not be seen as distinct and separate from each other, or from the balance of world security

The separation of military and civilian problem solving no longer exists in almost all cases. Conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post conflict reconstruction, are together the base upon which a large part of today's diplomacy in the area of Peace and security is built. BUT, unless violence stops there is no basis upon which to build governance and stability. The military must first build the platform on which almost every other support activity must rest.

The “integrated approach” to stabilisation operations is a reality. (By the way there is no magic in this.....at its simplest it means before we intervene we must have a plan and that plan must include as many of the participants in the project as possible.

Without it, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as we know it today will not succeed. In insurgencies like Afghanistan and elsewhere the message of the ‘enemy’ is a startlingly simple one. These foreigners will leave. We will stay. Stick with us we are your future.

Our only response must be to give the people a real choice by creating the secure and sustainable foundation upon which, with our continued help, they can build a better future and a real alternative.

The International Crisis Group says, the stakes of the game have risen dramatically as global implications of state fragility and failure have become more profound. Failure to consolidate peace and good governance in Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic, Yemen.

Conflicts in faraway places matter to us here in Europe.

These conflicts matter because we recognize that violence within any particular country can quickly cause national and regional instability, displacing millions of people, upending markets, and spilling over into neighboring countries. Conflicts undo the hard-earned progress countries have made toward building democracy, they weaken both governments and civil society, and they allow criminals and repressors to thrive.

They also matter because the instability created by these conflicts increasingly attracts extremist groups, who can use the vacuum of authority to terrorize civilian populations and plan and launch attacks. The suffering caused by these conflicts can be a powerful recruitment tool. Even conflicts that are not fueled at the outset by extremist elements can attract and foster them. Or, because state authority breaks down, places of conflict can be comfortable places for extremists. Whether it be Darfur, Mali, or the Central African Republic, we ignore these crises at our peril.

In 2011 a seminal World Development Report offers a ‘rough and ready’ approach to how development is done in post conflict environments – stressing the need to prioritise given the short time horizons we often work within; to build confidence, to focus on “inclusive-enough” political settlements and “good enough” reforms. It isolates three essential areas in post-conflict settings: security, justice and jobs.

Significantly, there is an explicit recognition that you have to get security and justice under control, otherwise you won't make progress.

In Europe the OSCE and NATO are and will continue to be players on the international peacekeeping and peace support stage. I believe that the OSCE, as a responsible regional organization under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, indicated in Vilnius that it too was hoping to engage its member states in a much more comprehensive approach to early warning, conflict prevention, peace keeping, and peace support, and in recent weeks we have seen the OSCE involved in the Ukraine in a more robust and meaningful way than ever before. The Mission there is being expanded, but OSCE is facing a very steep learning curve, and its consensus governance system makes the work very difficult. I sincerely hope that OSCE, which by happy coincidence for me, in 2015 is chaired by Serbia the country in which I spend most of my time, will be able to take a much more purposeful and better organized role in this, surely one of its most important tasks, than it has done in the past.

As for NATO. It remains a powerful alliance, but will I think be tempted to be far less ambitious in the near future.

It seems only yesterday that Nato was taking on the role of world policeman. "Out-of-area" operations were all the rage at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels. Afghanistan, it was confidently predicted, would be only the first of many successes.

That was then. A decade is several lifetimes in geopolitics. The appetite for intervention would now appear to have been sated – nowhere more than in Washington. Barack Obama wants to be remembered as the US president who brought the troops home. Enemies can be dealt with at a distance with drones and special forces. Syria can fight its own civil war. But in the past few weeks all these Obama baselines have come into question and we are again seeing US carrier borne aircraft striking in Iraq.....

NATO has adopted the Integrated Approach, and has come up with a definition The effective implementation of an integrated approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, and taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy. NATO now seems to understand the need for at least some interventions to be planned and executed within a plan which includes the civilian dimension and regards the military as just part of the solution.

The Ukraine has seen NATO looking for a role, or rather looking back to when it had a role as a defensive alliance against an existential threat from the East.

I still believe that, when the dust settles on Ukraine, or what is left of it, we are then most likely to see NATO being able to concentrate in the medium term on operations, under a UN mandate, in support of the UN in surge operations or as short term interventions followed as quickly as possible by a handover to UN or regional forces. France's intervention in Mali is an example of this where it was supported by NATO assets.

The Netherlands security and intelligence group in Mali in support of the UN operation, and the similar Swedish intervention all show a changing view

In short then there will be a continuing demand for UN and Regional peacekeeping intervention, based on the integrated model. These operations will include, at least in their early stages, the deployment of military force.

A hundred thousand UN Peacekeepers are serving around the world and as I have said, they are facing missions where the old rules of the game just don't apply any more.

Is UN peacekeeping fit for purpose, and can a divided Security Council make the decisions needed to meet its obligation to intervene where world peace and security are threatened?

Ban Ki Moon is thinking about it.

He has convened an Independent High Level Panel with a very broad mandate to report in the Autumn. They have been asked to make a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations today, and the needs of the future. The Secretary-General says that "the world is changing and UN peace operations must change with it".

There is a motion to convene a summit meeting of the Security Council this year to discuss Peacekeeping. Any declaration from this meeting should act as a guide for the next generation of Peace Operations.

As I have said, a number of the ‘givens’ in the maintenance of peace and security have changed. There are new challenges. The character of conflicts has changed. The UN now regularly keeps the peace where there is no peace to keep. The signatories to a peace agreement are frequently outnumbered by those who have refused to sign. Increasingly there are conflicts where there are no clearly identifiable parties. The threats are now mostly asymmetrical, and conflicts now take little account of State borders, in particular those which were the product of 19th, and early 20th Century interventionism.

Peacekeeping, without change, can no longer respond effectively to these new challenges. Since the end of the Cold War new practices have emerged such as ‘enforcement’. Can the UN be an enforcer and remain impartial? Is not the whole humanitarian enterprise, which relies on this impartiality threatened by such action. Most troop contributing countries believe that safety is legally linked to impartiality with bonds of steel.

The prospect of changing borders in the Middle East and the emergence of a new kind of hegemony there and elsewhere, bring into sharper focus the question of sovereignty and the Nation State. How does the notion of sovereignty which was shared by those who formulated the United Nations Charter fit with the challenges to that ‘universal principle’ today?

A well-argued and perceptive report by the High Level Panel (and this is by no means a given), should lead this year's momentum towards constructive change. But will the UN have the capacity and political will to implement the recommendations and those that will follow?

Ban Ki Moon said recently *A major obstacle to United Nations human rights action has been a concern among Member States that such action may harm national sovereignty. In reality, it is serious violations of human rights that weaken sovereignty.*

“Taking action”, said the SG, “in such cases is most fundamentally, a support to national sovereignty. We must be willing to act before situations deteriorate. We cannot afford to be indifferent.

And yet indifferent we continue to be.

Syria, Libya, and Yemen are in their death throws as nation states as the world watches. Some insight can be found in the reactions to Ban's statement by Russia and China.

“Consistent attempts are being made to turn the Security Council into an office to rubberstamp the decisions of the “leader,” (The United States) and when these attempts fail, they try to remove the UN Security Council from developing a policy on its key competence: said Sergei Lavrov.

We should uphold the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs. Sovereignty is the symbol of a country's independence. The sovereign independence and territorial integrity of countries must not be infringed upon” said China.

Interventions in Kosovo and Libya, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since the wide acceptance of Kofi Annan's Right to Protect for humanitarian reasons, have left the Russians and Chinese and many in the UN General Assembly deeply skeptical of western motives. *and don't ever forget that at least 100 members of the GA believe the US and NATO to be part of the problem not part of the solution.* This skepticism is also a feature of daily debate in the Security Council; the Council is as a result more divided than at any time since the cold war.

Peacekeeping needs reform. Ban Ki Moon is right.

The world should be preventing mass murder in Syria and Libya, and elsewhere. Ban Ki Moon is right.

The High Level Review should challenge the status quo. Are Integrated Mission, and multidimensional Missions really the Holy Grail? Does the experience of the fateful misunderstanding of this kind of Peacekeeping by the military in Afghanistan, and the lethal link that was established there between the military and the peace building and humanitarian community and the new norm of offensive peacekeeping elsewhere, suggest that the time has come for a complete break between the military peacekeepers and the peace builders and humanitarians. Should the Security Council go back to basics and authorise military missions, funded by the assessed contribution system, and give a separate mandate for all the other activities currently found in multidimensional Missions? Command and control of such operations should ideally still be in civilian hands, and a formula for this should not be too challenging.

History since the last Review is not encouraging.

The UN reacts.

It deals with one challenge at a time, and is very short of a capability to analyse and assess.

The bombing in Baghdad, a brutal terrorist attack on the UN Headquarters, brought about a sensible reorganization of the UN security system, but didn't highlight the need for the UN to have an effective and well funded capacity for defensive intelligence. The present focus on protection of civilians, and internal UN reports on its effectiveness, concentrate on the number of times force has been used, but do little to suggest that the use of force is a failure not a victory. The political strategic analysis is missing that asks the questions about why force was used and why it had become necessary. The machinery for producing this analysis is undermanned and underfunded.

Yet the UN appears to have gotten over its shyness about intelligence in the field, and in Mali and elsewhere has deployed national intelligence assets in blue helmets, but largely to produce tactical military intelligence, and not the broader strategic political analysis that is vital to decision making at Headquarters and in the field. And the use of UAVs, drones, is increasing, but with very localized tactical objectives and no real 'information management' machinery in place.

So will the world's handling of Peace and Security go through major change in 2015? Will peacekeeping face up to the real world of the 21st Century? With the profound differences in the Security Council, the

crumbling of national borders, the growth of international terrorism will the High Level Panel offer an iconoclastic prescription?

Ban's choice of panel members suggests not.....

Conclusion

I am often asked are military interventions in foreign countries an effective and legitimate instrument. Legitimised by a Security Council Resolution, and as only a part of a broader political construct, the answer is yes. What can be achieved is the preparation of a security platform upon which all the other parts of the international and national peace building effort can be continued, after the departure of foreign forces.

The question of whether UN peacekeeping can take on more must be seen in the light of few global alternatives. Of all the world's organizations, the UN is least able to turn its back on those whose very lives hang in the balance.

As LakhdarBrahimi, the wise man of the UN himself said to the General assembly earlier this year “ There will be plenty of surprises over the next decade. I am fairly certain that one thing will remain constant though and that is that UN peacekeeping shall continue to be in high demand” and he went on to repeat the plea he made ten years ago “ *I call on the leaders of the world to strengthen the capacity of the United nations to fully accomplish the mission which is indeed its very raison*

d'être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace”.

Ladies and Gentlemen Dag Hammarskjöld said

"The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell."

In order to come closer to heaven at least we need to adapt and change with the times. This year is a year for change