

Statement by Julian Harston

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“Peacekeeping and Peace Support

Where is multinational peacekeeping going and what will be the role of the military.
What are the threats and how best should member states react to them, together.”

Bern, 28 August 2013

For his presentation we asked Julian Harston to address particularly the following questions:

- 1. Are military interventions in foreign countries basically an effective and legitimate instrument? What can realistically be achieved, and what not, under what conditions?*
- 2. What direction is military peace support – or, more generally, the idea of military engagement abroad – presumably to take (after the lessons from Afghanistan)?*
- 3. What is the role that European states in particular could and should play in this?*
- 4. What role will/should armed forces have in future peace support operations?*

Those of you who are aware of my background will understand that as a UN person I have a particular sensitivity towards the role that can be played by foreigners in matters of national security. For that reason I feel honoured to have been trusted by being offered a small opportunity to guide the Swiss ship of State.

I believe that all of us should have heroes. I have two. That they are both British may not surprise you. Their lives were separated by 200 years, but they both have something to offer in this debate.

Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury was an English philosopher, best known today for his work on political philosophy. Hobbes conceived of the modern state in his *Leviathan*, published in 1651. He is known in these days, wrongly, as a gloomy philosopher because of his emphasis on anarchy. He was in fact a liberal optimist, who saw the state as a solution to anarchy, allowing people to procure possessions and build a community. Hobbes knew that the path toward a better world-order, let us call it peace, first has to be established. Only later can humankind set about making such order non-tyrannical.

Winston Churchill as a 23-year-old published his first book, ‘*The Story of the Malakand Field Force*’. In it, he gave advice on how an outside imperial power should deal with a country like Afghanistan. He was, of course, referring to how Britain should approach the population of the Pashtun frontier beyond the Indian subcontinent, but he might just as well

have been referring to how the early 21st century United States should do so. For much as the elites of the United States hate the expression, America remains in an imperial-like position in much of the world.

Churchill intimated three courses of action. The first course was to do nothing and leave. The second course was to initiate a large military operation until the people of the frontier are ‘as safe and civilized as Hyde Park’.

Whereas the first course is irresponsible, the second is unfeasible, given the expenditure of resources required. Then there is the third course: to manage the situation by dealing with the tribes, subsidizing and encouraging the good ones, punishing the bad, and creating stability and ‘good governance’ (although this is not a phrase that Churchill would have understood). Churchill didn’t think much of the third course but he saw no alternative for a great power, recognizing that any grand strategy must marry goals with available resources, and that in the end it is a sustainable peace that matters most.

What these two heroes of mine understood, and that was truly extraordinary in the 17th century, and only marginally less so in the 19th, was that a stable society and sustainable peace can only be built by creating enough security on the ground on which to build an inclusive political solution.

I worked with the United Kingdom Diplomatic Service for some 25 years before joining the United Nations as Head of the political department of the ill-fated UNPROFOR in 1995. My second career in the UN took me to Zagreb, to Belgrade (three times), to Sarajevo, to Haiti, to East Timor, to the Western Sahara and to New York. I was Head of the UN Missions in Haiti and Western Sahara, and I was Deputy in Sarajevo. In New York I was Director of Peacekeeping for Asia and the Middle East. I have worked in seven UN Peacekeeping Missions and directed the activities of five more. Above all I am a practitioner, not an academic. I have the added advantage of being retired. Thus the judgements I will offer you today are my own, not those of the UN or any of my previous masters.

The four questions I have been asked to address today involve among other things:

- the role of the armed forces in the support of Peace Operations, and their effectiveness;
- the future of peace support;
- what European states should be doing in this area in the future.

What do you think yourself about UN peacekeeping and its capabilities in dealing with issues of international peace and security through the mechanisms of peacekeeping and peace building? Perhaps not very much: too much politics and too little decisive action; waste of resources; bad command and control structures; poor security; difficult relations with regional organisations, e. g. with the African Union; soldiers who are only there for the money.

During my time in peacekeeping all these things have been true at one time or another, in greater or lesser measure. And yet, the UN can deliver large numbers of troops on the ground quickly, it has proven its ability to operate and sustain missions in some of the most hostile environments in the world. The UN has had some extraordinary successes and some very

bloody failures. UN peacekeeping is statistically more likely to succeed than any other variety, and it is cheaper.

Through the learning processes involved in our Missions in Cambodia, the Balkans, Haiti, Central America, Namibia and Mozambique the UN developed the concept that is now known as the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated approach’:

an understanding that peace can neither be kept nor built on the basis of a military plan that is divorced from a political strategy.

Senator Rumsfeld’s affirmation that the US Department of Defence’s plan for post invasion Iraq was ‘to have no plan’ was the starting point of a steep learning curve in the US, NATO and the EU that has led us to where we are today.

The integrated approach is the coordination and synergy, at political and strategic levels, of all available instruments of power, in order to enable each of these instruments to accomplish, at theatre and tactical levels, actions leading to a change of initially unacceptable conditions into a set of acceptable ones; the comprehensive end-state, if you like.

I understand the instinctive professional military reaction to peace building and the comprehensive approach. Life would be so much easier if we were all just allowed to do what we are good at. But life isn’t simple. The most important lesson learned by the UN in the last twenty years of peacekeeping is that with the right resources, the right mandate and the right leadership the comprehensive, civilian led, approach works and must be the basis of the international community’s efforts to deal with conflicts in the near future.

In the next few years you will hear more of Mali, the Central African Republic, the ungoverned spaces in North-West Africa, Yemen, Somalia and even perhaps a part of the Balkans as being real threats to us here in Europe which we need to deal with in a comprehensive way. What this kind of peacekeeping needs is professional military officers who understand that it is essentially a political process in which they are involved and professional civilians to manage the broader process. The more prepared the soldier, the easier it will be for the political side of the Mission to succeed to the point that it no longer needs the military and that they can move on with the job well done.

In January 2012 I was asked to undertake a Strategic Review of UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. I presented my report to the Security Council. UNIFIL was remodelled by the international community in the days which followed the war between Israel and Lebanon six or seven years ago. The new UNIFIL, with an authorized strength of 15,000 troops, together with a maritime component of six naval vessels, was operational within a few weeks. The Mission included significant contributions from NATO nations (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal) some wearing blue helmets for the first time since UNPROFOR in the late 1990s. The Mission has proven to be an outstanding military success. Southern Lebanon has had, until recently, the quietest five years in its history.

But Security Council Resolution 1701 which brought the new UNIFIL into being had a second and equally important objective. This was to bring about a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. This has not happened. What my review says is that unless there is political progress all that has been gained by the military risks being lost. All my recommendations are designed to bring the political track up to speed. They are designed to encourage the two parties to invest enough in political stability and to persuade them that going back to war would be fundamentally against their national interests. There isn't a better example for the fact that peace support is about politics and that the process, if the politics are left behind, will fail.

This is perhaps a good moment to reflect on Afghanistan. Almost all the lessons I identify here have been ignored there. With the result that we are now limping towards a withdrawal and Afghanistan may well be seen in the future as a copy book example of how *not* to do these things.

Echoing Lord Ashdown I would like to say the following: We failed to concentrate first on the rule of law and now find ourselves burdened with a Government in Kabul so tainted by corruption that its power over the state declines by the day. Far too much of our military strategy was chasing the enemy, when we should have been protecting the people. We wasted lives, resources, money and opportunities on our own ambitions rather than delivering the simpler things with which Afghans would have been content. We are ignorant of local customs, traditions and language.

We failed to understand that in these wars it is politics, not weapons, that counts most. Even if you win on the battlefield (and there is absolutely no doubt that in the two wars they fought in Afghanistan the military have been incredibly successful), you lose if you lose politically. Our greatest mistake of all is that when unity of command on the part of the interveners was crucial to success we have failed completely to achieve this. (Even today in Kabul there are no less than seven people of ambassador rank from the US.) A sustainable peace also requires that we do what we can to promote the constitutional structure that runs with the grain of Afghan tribal realities. It was arrogance compounded by ignorance that led us to press for a Western-style centralized constitution, complete with elections they can't afford without our money, in a country that has been decentralized and tribal for at least two thousand years.

And make no mistake, the blame for this cannot be simply attributed to NATO, to the coalition or even to the US, but must also be seen as a failure by those in the UN, who of all people should have known better.

You asked me in what direction the question of military support to peacekeeping and peace building is going. After a decade of considerable surge, it appeared until very recently that UN peacekeeping was headed toward a period of consolidation and perhaps even contraction. However, with the recent Missions in Syria, Libya, South Sudan and now Mali, this no longer seems to be the case.

The challenges peacekeepers are facing today remain daunting. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to environments that are inhospitable, remote and dangerous, sometimes with-

out adequate logistical support and resources. The diversity of missions continues to grow, as are the expectations of what UN peacekeeping can deliver. Missions' mandates are increasingly complex and multidimensional. We still have traditional missions supporting a ceasefire agreement between two parties like the one I was in charge of in Western Sahara; at the other end of the spectrum we have missions which cover vast territories, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, and have complex mandates ranging from supporting elections and state capacity to disarmament and demobilisation, strengthening the rule of law, improving the management of the security sector and so on. Other missions provide security and protection in response to a conflict. Increasingly, UN peacekeepers are called upon to take a more *robust* approach to implement their complex mandates.

The UN Security Council on 29 March 2013 unanimously approved an 'offensive' peacekeeping brigade to fight rebels in the DRC, the first UN force of its kind: 2,500 troops authorized to 'neutralize and disarm' rebel groups. This further excursion into 'robust' peacekeeping is rather troubling me, not just because it brings further into question the status of the peacekeeping force and, more importantly perhaps, of the humanitarians operating alongside that force, but because I have not yet seen a convincing political strategy and end-state for the DRC. (I see from yesterday's press that the brigade is already getting into trouble. So we will see.)

The Security Council has got into the habit of giving the mandate to 'protect civilians'. Although this sounds simple, it carries significant policy and operational challenges, and I think that as a result of this there will be no more Chapter 6 Missions in the future.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the emergence of a new type of operation which also seeks to address the underlying causes of conflict. What we have been trying to do – in East Timor for example within six to seven years – is to complete an evolutionary process that would normally take decades or even centuries. This is what we are all involved now in Afghanistan.

In the year 2000 the level of UN deployment was about 20,000. On 1 January 2013 some 100,000 military, police and civilian peacekeepers were deployed in 17 Missions, 1 AU operation and 10 Political Missions, budgeted at a total of \$8 billion. The annual procurement bill for peacekeeping now approaches \$3 billion. Each of these figures represents an all-time high.

Our discussions today are brought into sharper focus by recent events around the world, not least by what is going on or not going on in Syria.

The separation of military and civilian problem-solving no longer exists. There is no such thing anymore as dealing with the hard and soft issues separately. Conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction are together the base upon which diplomacy in the area of peace and security is built. *But* – and this is the key to one of the themes of our discussion today – unless violence stops there is no basis upon which to build governance and stability. The mili-

tary must first build the platform on which all the other things that support activity over a period of some years have to rest.

The ‘integrated approach’ to stabilization is a reality. There is no magic in this. At its simplest it means before we intervene we must have a plan and that plan must include as many of the participants in the project as possible.

Without it, peacekeeping and peace building will not succeed.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere the message of the ‘enemy’ is a startlingly simple one: these foreigners will leave, we will stay. Stick with us, we are your future.

Our only response must be to give people a real choice by creating a secure and sustainable foundation upon which, with our continued help, they can build a better future and a real alternative.

The International Crisis Group says, the stakes of the game have risen dramatically as global implications of state fragility and failure have become more profound. Failure to consolidate peace in Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and beyond no longer just impacts on the people of those countries: it opens the door to training camps for global terrorists; it permits new routes for trafficking of persons, arms and illegal drugs; it disrupts international trade and investment; it facilitates even the incubation of pandemic disease; it brings piracy – just to name a few.

In studying more than two dozen successful and failed peacekeeping operations since World War II, Donald Steinberg, one of the leaders of the International Crisis Group, says he found six key challenges that must be addressed nearly simultaneously. These challenges are:

- to restore State and human security;
- to build a responsive political framework;
- to kick-start the economy;
- to balance national reconciliation and the need for accountability;
- to promote civil society;
- to address the regional context.

In 2011 a seminal World Development Report offers a much more ‘rough and ready’ approach to how development is done in post-conflict environments – stressing the need to prioritise given the short time horizons we often work within; to focus on ‘inclusive-enough’ political settlements and ‘good enough’ reforms. It isolates three essential areas in post-conflict settings: *security, justice and jobs*.

There is an explicit recognition that you have to get security and justice under control; otherwise you won’t make any progress at all.

Peacekeeping operations can only succeed in the right political context, with a readiness for peace on the ground and a will to work for it in major capitals.

The question of whether UN peacekeeping can take on more must be seen in the light of the fact that there are so few global alternatives. Of all the world's organizations, the UN is least able to turn its back on those whose very lives hang in the balance. (I say that with some caution in a week where we are watching the world turn its back on Syria.)

As Lakhdar Brahimi, the wise man of the UN, said to the General Assembly not long ago, 'There will be plenty of surprises over the next decade. But I am fairly certain that one thing will remain constant, and that is that UN peacekeeping shall continue ...'

So there will be more UN peacekeeping, and many of the operations that exist today will continue for some time to come. The comprehensive integrated approach is in my view the ideal. But as in Mali and Somalia and doubtless in Syria each operation will in fact be *sui generis*, and will be planned and executed within at least an accepted premise that the integrated approach is an appropriate aspiration and that the military have a vital role to play, but only within a plan based on political imperatives and designed to last much longer than the military engagement.

In Europe the OSCE and NATO are and will continue to be players on the international peacekeeping and peace support stage. I believe that the OSCE, as a responsible regional organization under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, indicated at its meeting in Vilnius 18 months ago that it too is hoping to engage its member states in a much more comprehensive approach to early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace support. The resolution that came out of this meeting says: 'Acknowledging the need for timely and preventive responses to crises and conflicts, which requires, inter alia, a comprehensive early warning capacity across all three OSCE dimensions; timely, objective and verifiable information, also regarding the humanitarian and security conditions on the ground as well as the political will to take early and effective action; making full use of existing OSCE instruments, mechanisms and procedures ...' And it goes on: 'Recognizing that a comprehensive, cross-dimensional response is required to address the ... causes of crises and conflicts and that this also demands co-operation and co-ordination between the participating States ...'

I sincerely hope that the OSCE, which by happy coincidence for me will in 2014 be co-chaired by Serbia and Switzerland, the two countries in which I spend most of my time, will be able to take a much more purposeful and better organized role in this, surely one of its most important tasks, than it has done in the past.

NATO of course remains a powerful alliance, but will be tempted to be far less ambitious in the near future. All but France and the United Kingdom have lost any appetite for expeditionary warfare.

It seems only yesterday that NATO was taking on the role of world policeman. 'Out-of-area' operations were all the rage in Brussels. Afghanistan, it was confidently predicted, would be only the first of many successes. Even the Germans turned a blind eye to their constitution and sent troops beyond Europe's shores.

That was then. A decade is several lifetimes in geopolitics. The appetite for intervention would now appear to have been sated – nowhere more so than in Washington. Barack Obama wants to be remembered as the US President who brought troops home, despite the award of a Nobel Peace Prize when he was prosecuting two wars. After all, enemies can be dealt with at a distance, with drones and special forces. Syria can fight its own civil war – or, as we see today, maybe not. As for Germany, it seems to be re-adopting its old attitudes. Not that long ago the Berlin Government found itself in political trouble for sending a handful of soldiers to oversee the evacuation of German nationals from Libya. But while refusing to agree a definition of it, NATO has adopted the integrated approach, and now seems to understand the need for at least some interventions to be planned and executed within a plan which includes the civilian dimension and regards the military as just part of the solution. I believe that we are most likely to see NATO involved in the medium term in operations, under a UN mandate, in support of the UN in surge operations or as short-term interventions, followed as quickly as possible by a handover to UN or regional forces, as the French in Chad and Congo or the British in Sierra Leone. France's intervention in Mali, where it was supported by considerable NATO resources, is an example of this. In the short term then, there will be a continuing demand for UN and regional peacekeeping intervention, based on the integrated model. These operations will include, at least in their early stages, the deployment of military force.

I am asked: are military interventions in foreign countries an effective and legitimate instrument. If they are legitimised by a Security Council Resolution and only a part of a broader political construct, the answer is yes. What can be achieved is the preparation of a security platform upon which all the other parts of the international peace building effort can be continued after the departure of foreign forces.

What then is the role for Europe – one might say 'the North' – in all this. Above all, in my opinion, foreign and defence policy is about perceived national interest, tempered with domestic political expediency.

There is both a real security and political rationale for Europe to be involved in the military dimension of peacekeeping, and what might be described as a moral one, which, if ignored, takes on a significant political dimension.

You will doubtless be involved with other speakers in identifying the current security threats to Europe and the world, but I would suggest that you will conclude in the end, as did the UK Ministry of Defence, that the world is an increasingly dangerous place, and that 'the challenge has been to move from stability based on fear to stability based on the effective management of risks, seeking to prevent and contain conflicts rather than suppress them.'

'This requires', said the UK Defence Review, 'an integrated policy using all the instruments at our disposal, including diplomatic, developmental and military'.

I am reasonably sure that other speakers will identify the threats of interstate – and now more likely intrastate – warfare, transnational crime, dangerous regimes, Weapons of Mass destruc-

tion, international terrorism, radical Islam and cyber 'terrorism' as being those that should now be the centre of attention in security policy planning. And if they did, they would be right. For Switzerland one should add the threat to financial flows (there are, I am told, billions of dollars in Swiss banks from the Gulf alone) and to the flow of natural resources (Switzerland is unusual now in Europe in having a very dynamic production sector almost entirely reliant on the import of natural resources).

In the context of my presentation it is sufficient to say that UN peacekeeping is likely to take place in countries and locations – the vast empty spaces of northern Africa, Somalia, Syria and even a part of Europe, i.e. Macedonia – which will be easy for the North to identify as providing the breeding ground for many of the threats I have already identified and as being a direct or indirect threat to their security and well-being.

There are sound logical reasons for Europe and others in the North to take part in peacekeeping in the future. It will address real national political imperatives, including real economic and social threats.

I have mentioned also what I call the moral rationale.

In recent years there has been a growing pressure in the General Assembly, and in the Security Council, for the North, particularly the Permanent Members of the Council, to put their soldiers into harm's way. 'There is a huge mismatch between the mandates the Security Council gives to the peacekeeping missions and the resources they are willing to provide: rich countries are the worst offenders,' Anneke Van Woudenberg, the senior Congo researcher at Human Rights Watch, recently said. 'Where are the Europeans? Where is the United States? Where are the Canadians?'

The Council has been happy to vote for new Missions and allow willing troop contributors from the subcontinent and elsewhere to bear the military burden and risk, sheltering behind the argument that the North pays the bill.

India and others are now saying this has gone on long enough, and the UK, France and others are beginning to hear the message.

I believe that we will see British, French and other European troops taking an increasing part in UN peacekeeping operations in the next few years. Not, I think, as boots on the ground in large numbers for long periods, but in surge operations, in enabling units for short-term deployment and offering specialist skills and support in the increasingly complex peacekeeping environment. In the Congo the UN is now involved in the use of drones and, as I understand, in cyber-activity. The UK, France and others will find public support for peacekeeping despite the disenchantment for large-scale overseas military engagement which resulted, I think, from the losses and, dare I say, failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their military establishments will also see merit in opportunities to use their expeditionary warfare assets, on which large amounts of money is being spent. (The UK is in the throes of building the two largest ships in the history of the Royal Navy.) The military themselves will be happy to have a new focus, opportunities for 'active service' and the promotions that go with it.

I will finish by suggesting what I believe will best serve the Swiss national interest over the next few years in the area of peacekeeping and peace support. I have no doubt at all that it would be entirely legal and in your national interest to be involved in peacekeeping operations that have the sanction and legitimacy of a UN Security Council Resolution, whether with the UN, or the OSCE, or even, as is presently the case, with NATO. As I have said, Switzerland depends, perhaps more than most nations, on stability in world markets. Switzerland, too, is deeply concerned by the mass movement of peoples. Your country must be interested in preventing the conditions which encourage terrorist training facilities and the spread of Weapons of Mass destruction.

Switzerland shares the moral responsibility of the North to take a more active role. You are the 16th largest contributor to the overall UN budget, of which you cover 1.13%. In 2010, Swiss taxpayers paid roughly \$120 million to the UN peacekeeping budget of around \$7.7 billion. In the number of people deployed in uniform in peacekeeping the Confederation ranks 85th.

You are much admired for your humanitarian tradition, and it could be said that many people in the world continue to 'expect' neutral Switzerland to be present in the Conference Halls, at the negotiation table, both overt and covert, and on the battlefield to continue in its efforts to make the world a better place.

In its Security Policy Report of 2010, the Swiss Government advocated a qualitative increase in peacekeeping contributions, a greater focus on air transport, ground transport, logistics and high-quality niche capabilities. But an intermediate defence policy (the so-called 'Development Step 2008/11') identified the support to domestic civil authorities as the most likely deployment scenario for the Swiss Armed Forces.

I believe that there is not just a moral imperative for increased Swiss participation in making the world, not just Switzerland, a safer place, but a political imperative too. It is not in my view an exaggeration to say that the international community expects from a rich country that greatly takes advantage of the positive aspects of globalization to contribute significantly to solving some of the world's security problems. Contributing to peace operations is a very visible and cost-effective way of doing so.

As an amateur student of the tides of opinion in Swiss politics I do not believe that more than company-size contributions to military peacekeeping, beyond the current engagement in Kosovo, look likely. And in any event I would not ask for them. Stability in Kosovo was in Switzerland's interest not least because of its relative geographic proximity and a substantial influx of refugees from the region to Switzerland.

Switzerland is about quality, not quantity. I would rather support the provision of niche contributions in the form of high-value assets and experts, e.g. transport, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and I believe that these would be likely to attract wider support in Bern. In terms of international recognition, and the 'moral dimension' of course, expert contributions have much lower visibility than people in blue helmets, but politics is the art of the possible. My conviction is that with a well-targeted, high-value and well thought-out integrated increase in Switzerland's military and civilian

contribution, Switzerland would be seen to be taking on a clearer responsibility for international peace and security and that this would be the best ammunition against those who despite their admiration for the Swiss continue to believe that Switzerland is inclined to profit, whilst others take the strain.

I am encouraged by the exercise we are going through here and I hope at least that it leads to a clear strategy and a political commitment to implement that strategy. What is needed for such a progress are of course the financial and human resources, and, more importantly, that Government makes it clear that in future, peace operations will be one of the key roles of the Swiss Armed Forces. I cannot think of a serious military in Europe, including Sweden and Austria, which does not have specified as one of its main capabilities, indeed as one of its main *raison d'être*, participation in international peace operations and which does not spend a great deal more than the one percent or so of the defence budget that Switzerland presently allocates to these endeavours.

The Swiss Armed Forces possess with SWISSINT a UN and NATO certified training centre, which offers domestic and international courses, especially for military observers. This training and expertise is complemented by the so-called Geneva centres: the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). The Swiss Armed Forces have limited but high-quality capabilities in logistics, engineering and transport. The professional civilian background of Swiss militia soldiers and officers is an asset in SSR, Rule of Law and many other specialist functions which benefit from civilian competencies and expertise. Switzerland could certainly provide more French-speaking soldiers and officers as Military Observers in an increasingly francophone peacekeeping environment. Indeed, the multi-ethnic Swiss militia can provide a better understanding and more expertise in a wide variety of international environments than most European militaries.

One area I believe demands attention is a feeling that I have identified in discussions with some of Switzerland's military leadership: that international service does not make better officers. It is thus undervalued. I would say what I used to say in Bosnia to visiting senior British police officers. 'We send you back much better police officers than you send us.' In the UN they tend to have had more responsibility than at home, they have worked in an international environment and have broadened their skills and experience. The same is true of the military. International military service is 'active service' and should, in my view, be one of the keys to promotion to the highest command positions.

When I asked the Department of Peacekeeping in New York what Switzerland could do, I found that their wish list was very close to my own: *Switzerland could contribute more United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), French-speaking officers and well-trained females. Switzerland has in its army high-level technologies such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, radars, sensors etc. which our Missions could use. In general, we are looking for enablers, en-*

gineers, logistic and hospital assets etc. What is more, Switzerland could support developing countries in the areas of training and equipment.

In discussing with the UN Department of Peacekeeping, my experience has been that Switzerland has underplayed its hand in seeking both civilian and military command positions in the system. You need your charming diplomats to take a much more robust approach to the Secretariat. You have very widely recognized attributes which qualify you more than most to take a lead. My experience in New York was that those member states that are assertive succeed.

When I asked the OSCE what Switzerland could do, they were more modest: *Swiss parliamentarians should take note of the work which is currently being done to enhance the OSCE's role throughout the conflict cycle. Switzerland could make a valuable contribution to improving the OSCE's ability to address conflicts and respond to crises. The Swiss could for instance be encouraged to contribute with material to the virtual pool of equipment for use in early action.*

OSCE is thus recognizing that Switzerland could and should offer some of the world beating expertise that it has in order to help the OSCE and, consequently, to improve its own national security.

If I may sum up: yes, there will continue to be a worldwide demand for UN and other forms of multilateral peacekeeping in the next ten years. Yes, the military will continue to play a vital, effective and legitimate role, as part of an integrated plan. The European states (the North) will come under more pressure to take an active military role in peacekeeping, both for reasons of national security and as a result of moral pressure. Of course, each state will make its own decisions about participation.

Switzerland, too, is threatened in an increasingly unstable world. The threat is not now a localised existential one but a much more diverse one originating in the most part far from the borders of the Confederation. It is truly an international threat, and Switzerland should be seen to have an active part in the international response.

The Swiss should offer more to peace operations, not in terms of large numbers of boots on the ground, but in terms of the extraordinary abilities it has in both civilian and military areas, and above all in sharing its world class credibility and its humanitarian tradition in a more generous, well-planned way.