


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Intelligence Assessment and Risk Analysis in the United Nations.

A necessity.

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'We are fully aware of your long-standing limitations in gathering information. The limitations are inherent in the very nature of the United Nations and therefore of any operation conducted by it.'

UN Secretary-General U Thant to the Commander of the UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC), Lt-Gen. Kebede Guebre, in a coded cable on 24 September 1962.

"Through error, misjudgment and an inability to recognize the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to save the people of Srebrenica from mass murder." Kofi Annan

At times today it was difficult to distinguish the fighters on this side of the bridge from those on the other side. They wore the same clothes, the same wigs. They carried the same weapons. (Fighters on this side have a penchant for spray-painting their guns.) Neither side seemed to have any purpose beyond defeating the enemy. All sides said they were tired of fighting. One soldier, wearing dirty soccer cleats, described how he came to this side of the bridge. Last February, he was captured by government forces and sent to fight. Then he was captured by rebels and sent to a training camp for three weeks and then sent to fight again. He said he found his former commander and had him executed'. New York Times on Liberia 2001

Ladies and Gentlemen

In some ways I am here under false pretences.

I have never served in a Mission which made regular use of Intelligence. It is slightly daunting to see so many of you with at least some experience of intelligence led operations.

It is not however in my nature to remain daunted for long!

I propose to make it up to you in other ways.

What I do bring to the table is extensive experience in the management of Peacekeeping Operations, including twice as SRSG and once as Deputy SRSG.

What I also bring, and I can be franker about it than I have been used to since I retired from the United Nations three years ago, more than 25 years in the Intelligence business.

It is one hundred and four years ago that the modern United Kingdom Intelligence Services were born.

“In October of 1909, the Royal Navy’s intelligence chief, was tasked with finding a suitable candidate to head up the foreign section of a new agency to be called the Secret Service Bureau. The Admiral scrawled a short letter marked “Private” and had it delivered to a semi-retired naval commander living on a houseboat in the south of England.. “My dear Mansfield Cumming, You may perhaps like a new job. If so I have something good I can offer you and if you would like to come and see me on Thursday about noon I will tell you what it is.” Cumming had fought in operations against Malay pirates before seasickness saw him declared unfit for service at sea. Aged 50 when he received his friend’s letter, he accepted the offer and was the first head of what would become MI6, the British Secret Service.” Known in the Service as ‘C’, by the way, as have all subsequent Chiefs been known.....not ‘M’ as in the James Bond movies.

So, leaders in Government, in the Military, have long recognized the need for sound Intelligence assessments and they have put them to good use? What can we learn from that in a UN context?

The UN was set up not because keeping the peace, upholding human rights, easing poverty and taming terrorism was easy, but because it was hard.

In August 2010 154 women, girls and boys were raped by rebel forces in and around Luvungi, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Many were said to have been gang-raped in their homes, in front of their families. Among them were four babies, aged one month, six months, a year and 18 months. United Nations peacekeepers were stationed barely 30 Kilometers away. After events of such horror, it is not unreasonable to wonder what they thought they were there for.

Little is simple in the chaos of the DRC, and the exact sequence of events leading to this startling inaction remains murky. Certainly, UN forces were aware that rebels from a Rwandan group known as the FDLR, and also from the Congolese Mai Mai militia, were active in the area. At least two UN patrols are known to have passed through villages while these attacks were taking place, without subsequently reporting anything untoward. Officially, UN forces remained in the dark for a further two weeks.

Rape and violence are endemic in the DRC. Before this attack, 8,300 rapes were reported in eastern Congo in the previous year alone. Peacekeepers themselves have been accused of numerous outrages, including looting, rape, and complicity to mineral exploitation. The President has repeatedly demanded their withdrawal, claiming they have failed in their mandate. Yet his command of his own military has not suggested that he is remotely capable of keeping order either. The army in the DRC is often charged with behaving little better than some rebel groups, and the invasion of Luvungi itself is thought to have been the result of its local presence being suddenly removed.

The Secretary General, declared the rapes of Luvungi “an outrage” and sent two senior UN representatives to the country. The move was, of course, welcome. Yet the UN’s failure in the DRC is already glaring, and this atrocity is merely a symptom of that. It is not enough merely to provide blue berets. Tasks must be clearly defined and lines of communication must, at least, be competent.

The efficacy of the UN as a force for stability in the world is not a given. It must be earned, time and again.

When it fails at the delicate business of sanctions and international pressure, that is one thing. When it fails at even noticing the brutal rampages of a militia, despite having an armed force a mere 19 miles away, that is far worse. (editorial. London Times. Sept 2010)

For many years the UN has been very shy about the use of the word Intelligence. People from different cultural and political environments have always reacted unpredictably to the thought that the United Nations might possess its own Intelligence capability, just as they have always reacted, some might say entirely predictably, to the thought that the UN might possess a standing Military Force.....its own Army.

As a leading Swedish practitioner has said, a common view within the United Nations system has been that intelligence and an intelligence service are illegitimate elements in a UN context, even in field operations. An organisation like the UN has to be completely open and transparent, according to this view, and must not involve itself in any intelligence activities, which may hurt its relations with the local parties.

This attitude, sometimes summarised as ‘intelligence is a dirty word,’ is strange, considering that traditional peacekeeping, emphasising observations and reporting, actually consists mainly of surveillance. In today’s peacekeeping operationsⁱ this approach could very well jeopardise both the life of the

peacekeepers and the success of an operation.

Let me emphasise that peacekeeping organisations (especially the UN) *as they exist today* cannot realistically maintain an advanced, comprehensive and combined intelligence service of their own at a strategic level. Thus, the focus here is on operational/tactical level intelligence and, to some extent, on the national strategic level.

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia during the UN operation there demonstrated that some countries do not hesitate to attach well-developed national intelligence assets, outside the UN's control, to their contributions to the UN. (Both Generals Janvier and Rose had extensive nationally owned intelligence teams, including electronic intelligence at their service) These nations consider it absurd to send troops to a sensitive area without the capability to analyse the situation properly. They furthermore co-operate in unofficial 'clubs,' often founded on traditional alliances. 'Membership' is earned by proof of the ability to contribute useful information and capability for handling the information in a responsible way.

So let us not be afraid of the word 'intelligence'. I agree with the excellent UN General Cammaert who said 'intelligence is decision-support.'

Everything else is information.

Without tailored decision-support at the strategic level he says, the mandate will not be correct. Without tailored decision-support at the operational level, the force structure and the timing of forces will not be correct. Finally, without decision-support at the tactical level, UN forces and the UN Mission will be at risk'. What is clear is that the principals of war remain the basic tenets of military planning and action –whether in a peace support or peace enforcement operation. First, you must have the right force, with the right equipment and training, at the right place and time in order to conduct operations. Then you have to apply those principles, within a doctrinal frame work and specific rules of engagement (ROE), to execute those operations.

In order to accomplish all of this in a peacekeeping environment, you need to plan correctly, based on the realities of the situation and allowing for possible escalation in the expected levels of conflict and destabilisation that may be

encountered. Our goal should be early understanding, not just early warning. **We need to understand why certain things are happening, not just what is happening.**

We need, as well, a dynamic assessment/reassessment process, not a onetime event or static measurement. In particular in terms of gauging the likelihood of crimes and violations against the local population, the rates and direction of change in key indicators are critical. As Robert Luck said recently in New York, 'We need a moving picture, not a snapshot. Crimes against local populations in such situations have multiple dimensions, so we cannot focus on a single factor or event.

But let us be clear: early warning is not an end in itself. Early warning without early and effective action would only serve to reinforce stereotypes of UN fecklessness, of its penchant for words over deeds. The Secretary-General's strategy should seek to overcome that prevalent perception.. alas all too often it does not.

Planning needs an accurate information base and specific intelligence products. It has, however, been the experience of many Heads of Mission and Force Commanders that the successful execution of operations and remaining within the decision cycle of belligerent, spoiler forces in a complex multidimensional peacekeeping environment, is inevitably problematic, as there is rarely adequate operational- and tactical-level intelligence available. The challenge of intelligence in peacekeeping is that these operations differ considerably from traditional military combat or 'kinetic' (awful word!) operations. Different mandates, special rules of engagement, belligerent 'rules of the game' – almost everything is unique, and this requires that the operational intelligence unit reorients and adjusts itself accordingly. It is important, in conducting peacekeeping intelligence analyses, to understand very clearly that traditional military indicators are not the primary signals that must be perceived and integrated. Unconventional combatants do not drive tanks, they drive 'technicals' – 4x4 pick-up trucks with machine guns crudely mounted in the back. The complex operational environment is unpredictable and asymmetric, and it is precisely in these situations that operations must be 'intelligence-

driven' from the perspective of being initiated, guided by and based on accurate, relevant, real-time intelligence products.

From force generation down to the utilization of a section of infantry on the ground in a UN PSO, information is needed – accurate, current information, and specifically the analysed information product that we call 'intelligence'. This is becoming more critical, due to the change from traditional PKOs to increasingly complex multidimensional PKOs in much more volatile circumstances.

While the need for accurate, current intelligence is apparent, there is even now a reluctance to classify and define intelligence in the UN structures clearly. The term 'military information' is still being used in many quarters, despite the fact that a mission needs political, humanitarian, socio-economic, security and other forms of intelligence, rather than the mere dispositions, capabilities and actions of militarised forces. NATO has begun to use the word KNOWLEDGE to stand for assessed information from open and covert sources.....maybe we can learn from this.

Progress has been made. Especially important has been the emerging concept, doctrine, and practical field implementation of the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) capabilities.

In an excellent paper on Haiti Walter Dorn says

' In the slums of Haiti, where pistol and machete wielding gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror, a UN peacekeeping mission managed to established law, order, and government control. The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) succeeded by 'taking on' the gangs in a series of military and police 'search and arrest' operations in 2006-07. The achievement was made possible by thorough 'intelligence preparation of the environment'. His paper tells the story of the 'intelligence-led' military-police-civil operations and how they transformed the Haitian slum of Cite´ Soleil from a foreboding place inaccessible to police for years to one in which the UN workers could safely walk its streets.

The functions, structures, problems and challenges of the mission's intelligence capability are described, especially the work of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Human intelligence proved to be key, while technologies helped considerably. Within the United Nations, intelligence remains a controversial and sensitive matter but the Haiti mission provides a valuable model of how to gather and use actionable intelligence. ‘

Finally, a key lesson from the JMAC experience is that UN intelligence should no longer be considered an oxymoron. At the operational level, JMACs have demonstrated that the UN is capable of producing high-quality and relevant intelligence assessments when given the necessary mandate and human resources. Contrary to the criticisms often levelled at the UN, JMACs in the field have proved capable of protecting the confidentiality of such information against leaks to the host government, staff members’ national governments, and to the public at large. The JMAC experience could then pave the way for increased support on the part of member states for UN intelligence work overall, both at headquarters and in the field, in order to support the UN’s growing role in conflict prevention.

A second noteworthy finding is that based on interviews and surveys of JMAC staff, it appears that civil-military collaboration within JMAC works well. Staff do not report clashes between military and civilian work cultures, Based on interviews and surveys conducted by the author in 2010, it appears that the JMAC model has largely proved its value over the course of its five-year existence,

even if implementation can still be optimized. JMACs have distinguished themselves especially in larger missions where information-sharing and -management can be a significant challenge. In some of these larger missions, JMACs have succeeded in positioning themselves as “antiestablishment units” within the larger mission, capable of challenging perceived notions or speaking uncomfortable truths. JMACs can also play a key role where self-interest may be affecting the reporting and analysis of other units.

The JMACs that are able to take on such a role are typically those that enjoy strong support from senior mission management and that obtain a significant proportion of their information from their own sources (as opposed to exclusively from UN military, police or civilian sources, or from media reports). Conversely, the added value of JMACs is less clear in smaller missions where information flows are easier because there is less information overall and because the smaller number of staff makes personal rapport easier

The essence of this discussion "why do we need intelligence gathering and assessment mechanisms such as the UN JMAC", both on a macro and micro level.

Today I will first provide a quick overview of the development of peacekeeping in recent years, outlining some of the issues that are at play.

Then some reflections on the field, focusing on my own role, that of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. And finally some personal reflections on

the problems and challenges of UN Peacekeeping in 2013. I hope that these thoughts— which are personal, not official, in nature – may be useful in sparking our follow-on discussion. Now lets talk about UN peacekeeping,

After a decade of considerable surge, it appeared until very recently that UN peacekeeping was headed toward a period of consolidation and perhaps even contraction., however with the recent Mission in Syria and Libya, and South Sudan this no longer seems to be the case.

The challenges we are facing today in many ways remain daunting. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to environments that are inhospitable, remote and dangerous, sometimes with inadequate logistical support and resources. The diversity of our missions is likely to continue to grow, as are the expectations in terms of what UN peacekeeping should deliver. Missions' mandates are increasingly more complex and multidimensional. While we still have traditional missions supporting a ceasefire agreement between two or more parties, we also manage multi-dimensional missions, supporting a peace process and national authorities after civil conflict, on the other end of the spectrum. These missions cover vast territories, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, and have complex mandates ranging from supporting elections and state capacity, to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and improving the management of the security sector. Other missions provide security and protection in response to a conflict. Increasingly, UN peacekeepers are called upon to take a more robust approach to implement complex mission mandates, and to deter spoilers to a peace

process, to the mandate, and to mission personnel. They are called upon to protect civilians, including from sexual violence in conflict. This carries significant policy and operational challenges.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the emergence of a new type of operation, which also seeks to address the underlying causes of conflict. These operations have found themselves involved in activities to promote democratic practices; to build sustainable institutions; and to enhance respect for human rights. They essentially attempt to enable a society to complete within six to seven years an evolutionary process that would ordinarily take decades or centuries. (and as I have said earlier this is exactly the kind of operation that we are all involved in in Afghanistan.)

On 1 January 2013 some 100,000 military, police and civilian peacekeepers were deployed in 17 Peacekeeping operations, one AU operation and 10 Political Missions, budgeted at a total of \$8 billion.

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Today the UN operates and maintains more than 30 level 2 and level 3 medical facilities, almost 200 aircraft, 17,000 vehicles, and 40,000 computers. In the last year, we chartered over 300 aircraft and 20 ships to move cargo and people. The annual procurement bill for peacekeeping now approaches \$3 billion annually. Each of these figures still represents an historic high.

Our discussions today are brought into sharper focus by recent events around the world .

Peacekeeping and peace building national security and human security issues form one continuum. There is no dividing line any more between the hard issues and the so called soft issues. Neither are conflicts limited any longer by national borders, and they can not be seen as distinct and separate from each other, or from the balance of world security

The separation of military and civilian problem solving no longer exists in almost all cases. Conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post conflict reconstruction, are together the base upon which a large part of today's diplomacy in the area of Peace and security is built. BUT, unless violence stops there is no basis upon which to build governance and stability. .

As the International Crisis Group says, the stakes of the game have risen dramatically as global implications of state fragility and failure have become more profound. Failure to consolidate peace and an acceptable form of governance in Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and beyond no longer just impacts on people of those countries, but opens door to training camps for global terrorists; permits new routes for trafficking of persons, arms and illegal drugs;

spawns a flood of refugees across borders and even oceans; disrupts international trade and investment; facilitates incubation of pandemic disease; and even brings piracy. In these circumstances guiding sensible decision making in such a vast enterprise becomes daily more important. The gathering and sensible analysis of information becomes essential

Management of peacekeeping in the field

I would now like to discuss the organization of peacekeeping in the field, and in particular the role of the SRSG.

As the scope of peacekeeping mandates has grown, the responsibilities of the SRSG, the Head of the Mission, have grown likewise. In order to accomplish his or her tasks, today's Head of Mission must possess an unlikely blend of political/diplomatic expertise; technical expertise (or at least managerial skills); and a capacity to frame a vision, and to convey that vision to others. The presence of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the field is the expression of the political will of the international community to solve the problem

An SRSG must have diplomatic skills. These skills are indispensable in the case of today's more typical multi-dimensional operations, the roles of which are often highly sensitive and intrusive, and have little chance of success unless their leadership can read a situation accurately, and can speak with political nuance to a number of interlocutors.

The SRSG must convey to the host country or countries that he or she is a conduit to power outside of the conflict, and make their viewpoint somehow comprehensible in a productive way. .

He must be able to describe the situation to those in New York – within the senior leadership of DPKO and to the Security Council and representatives of other key States. It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that New York’s leadership may be suffering from an overdose of crises, and what may seem a vital point in the field may be arriving on a very full desk.

In such a situation, diplomatic skills may be essential for internal communications too.

Second, as head of a field operation, an SRSG must be an effective manager. The SRSG must be able to work in the nuanced environment of the United Nations where – even more than most other institutions -- power is not determined by an organigramme, but by personal relationships. The SRSG’s power comes from persuasion as well as influence and the authority of his position.

In today’s operations, an SRSG must be able to work with and harmonize the efforts of an enormously varied number of actors on the ground. Military, police,

political and human rights experts, logisticians and administrators will all expect to have a sympathetic hearing from him or her.

He or she must have the key attributes of a good manager – be able to select a superb team, to listen, to motivate and encourage, and to delegate.

Third, the SRSB must to some degree be a visionary.

There is a great deal of latitude in the guidance provided by the Security Council, and the Security Council mandate is a starting point, not a finished picture. An SRSB may influence the Council's way of seeing things; but, at the same time, even once the Council has spoken, the SRSB may and indeed must interpret how this is to be done on the ground. An SRSB should have the capacity to translate a piece of dry, diplomatic prose crafted through painstaking negotiations in New York into a living document that guides daily reality for those on the ground. Alongside a fine political nose and intuition for what the political traffic will bear, the SRSB must have histrionic gifts and a reserve of self-confidence so that he or she can make this something real, clearly conveying conviction as to the importance of the international values that this resolution should advance.

The SRSB must also be able to speak to the wider public. Increasingly, there is a need to convey to the world's media what is happening. Likewise in the field,

depending on the operation, it may be useful and even indispensable for the SRSG to be a public figure.

For an SRSG this new dynamic situation in the field translates into a particularly demanding and multi-faceted role, which can only be discharged effectively with a keen awareness of the views of all key players in this enterprise, including, in particular, the military. Although these demands can be daunting at times, and officers need to be both resourceful and resilient to cope well, there is tremendous satisfaction when analysis and action come together successfully to bring stability to war-torn States and communities. It is, I believe one of the best jobs in the world.!

Conclusion

.....And now some personal observations on the state of Peacekeeping in 2012, and where we should go from here.

Peacekeeping is a flagship-endeavour of the United Nations and represents the whole of the Organisation. Millions of people depend, every day, on UN peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping operations can only succeed in the right political context, with a readiness for peace on the ground, and a will to work for it in major capitals. No matter how good are the plans developed in New York, or how persuasive a case the Department may make to the Security Council or to troop-contributors, any peace effort will be doomed to failure without these prerequisites.

The question of whether UN peacekeeping can take on more must be seen in the light of few global alternatives. Of all the world's organizations, the UN is least able to turn its back on those whose very lives hang in the balance.

As LakhdarBrahimi, the wise man of the UN himself said to the General assembly earlier this year “ There will be plenty of surprises over the next decade. I am fairly certain that one thing will remain constant though and that is that UN peacekeeping shall continue to be in high demand” and he went on to repeat the plea he made ten years ago

“ I call on the leaders of the world to strengthen the capacity of the United nations to fully accomplish the mission which is indeed its very raison d'être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace”.

Yet, the dangers of taking on too much cannot be ignored either.

The catastrophic failure of any one operation could undermine confidence in UN peacekeeping and in the UN as a whole.

A sensible measured assessment of the situation before committing the UN, and consistent high quality intelligence after deployment will go a long way to

avoiding such a failure.....if the UN hierarchy and the legislative bodies allow it.

No sensible Government in the world and indeed no sensible multinational operates without the capability to provide its leadership with well informed balanced assessments upon which to make tactical and strategic decisions. The UN has not been good at this in the past. If it is to do better in the future it will not just need to develop systems but attract the best and the brightest, both military and civilian, to make those systems work. Intelligence can often be the difference between success and failure. It is up to you and those who follow you to make it a success. In ending let me quote from Heidi Tagliavini's extraordinary report on the Russo/Georgian conflict , published a couple of years ago:

Thus a series of mistakes, misperceptions and missed opportunities on all sides accumulated to a point where the danger of an explosion of violence became real. Unlike in the early 1990s, what was about to happen in August 2008 was no longer a localised conflict in a remote part of the world but a short, bitter armed confrontation between two states, fought in the battlefield but also on live television, and carrying major international implications.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the UN and others made costly mistakes because decision makers simply did not know enough to avoid them.
